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My Response 
Stanley Fish* 
I.  THE THESIS 
The book under discussion begins by noting that the literature of 
academic freedom is a literature of persistent and basic questions.1  Is 
academic freedom a subset of the First Amendment and, therefore, 
something that affords legal protection to those who qualify as academics?  
Or is academic freedom a subset of freedom in the larger philosophical 
sense and therefore a political rather than a legal project?  Or (a third 
possibility) is academic freedom a less exalted concept, neither a legal right 
nor a philosophical imperative, but the name of a guild desire, the desire to 
be free from external monitoring and discipline in the workplace.  (This, of 
course, is the desire of all professions.) If that’s all there is to it—a claim of 
special privilege—what, if anything, justifies affirming the claim?  Do 
academics who work in public universities enjoy a status superior to that of 
other public employees?  Are academics, unlike other employees, free to 
criticize their superiors without fear of retaliation?  Does academic freedom 
attach to the university, or does it attach to the individual professor?  Do 
students have academic freedom rights?  Do courts recognize academic 
freedom, and do they base decisions on the doctrine?  Do classroom 
teachers have an academic freedom right to depart from strictly academic 
concerns? 
As I explored these questions, each of which has a literature of its own, 
I noticed that the answers to them varied depending on whether academic 
freedom was conceived narrowly—as a freedom conditioned by the 
particular obligations of the academic task—or conceived expansively as a 
general obligation to support the cause of freedom wherever it is under 
threat.  Is academic freedom intelligible only within the confines of a 
singular profession—is it a professional norm?—or it is a norm that guides, 
or should guide, the actions of all right-thinking men and women, whether 
 
 * Professor Fish is the Davidson-Kahn Distinguished University Professor of Humanities and 
Law at the Florida International University College of Law; B.A., University of Pennsylvania; M.A., 
Yale University; Ph.D., Yale University.  This article is written in response to critiques and criticisms of 
his forthcoming book, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO REVOLUTION, 
as they were written and published in Volume 9:1 of the FIU LAW REVIEW. 
1 STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO REVOLUTION 
(forthcoming 2014) (on file with the FIU Law Review). 
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they are standing in front of a classroom or standing in front of the 
barricades.  These alternate conceptions, and the gradations between them, 
can be captured by a simple formula: as one moves from a restrictive to an 
expansive notion of academic freedom—as one moves from right to left— 
the force of “academic” as a limiting adjective is less and less felt, and the 
scope of the word freedom more and more enlarged.  Hence the subtitle of 
the book: “From Professionalism to Revolution.” 
In my analysis one moves from professionalism to revolution in five 
stages, and I call these stages the five schools of academic freedom.  Here 
they are. 
1) The “it’s just a job” school (to which I belong).  This school is 
deflationary; it regards higher education not as a vocation or holy 
calling, but as a provider of services.  Colleges and universities 
offer disciplinary knowledge and skills to students who wish to 
receive them.  Faculty members are trained to impart that 
knowledge, demonstrate those skills and engage in research that 
adds to the body of what is known.  They are professionals, not 
moralists, or therapists or change agents, and when they are 
engaged in professional activities, narrowly defined, they should 
be accorded the latitude—call it freedom if you like—necessary to 
their proper performance.  When they depart from their 
professional responsibilities they merit blame, not freedom. 
 
2) The “for the common good” school.  This school has origin in the 
1915 AAUP Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Academic Tenure,2 and it shares some arguments with the “it’s just 
a job” school, especially the argument that the freedom accorded 
academics is conditioned on their hewing to academic 
responsibilities and not using their position in the university as a 
“shelter . . . for uncritical and intemperate partisanship.” However, 
the “for the common good” school departs from the severe 
professionalism of the “it’s just a job” school when it links the 
performance of responsible scholarship to the flourishing of 
democracy.  The reasoning is that democracy requires credentialed 
experts in order to check “the tyranny of public opinion” and thus 
“train” the less expert citizenry.  By using an external measure—
the health of democracy—to justify the academy, this school opens 
the way to the de-emphasizing of  “academic” in favor of the more 
 
2  See American Association of University Professors, 1915 Declaration of Principles on 
Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure (1915), available at http://www.aaup.org/file/1915-
Declaration-of-Principles-o-nAcademic-Freedom-and-Academic-Tenure.pdf. 
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abstract value of freedom. 
 
3) The “for uncommon beings” or “academic exceptionalism” school.  
If academics are charged not merely with the task of adding to our 
knowledge, but with the task of providing a counterweight to 
common popular opinion, they must themselves be uncommon, 
not only intellectually, but morally.  They must be, in the words of 
the 1915 Declaration, “men of high gift and character.”  Such men 
(and now women) not only correct the errors of popular opinion; 
they escape popular judgment and are not to be held accountable to 
the same laws and restrictions that constrain ordinary citizens. 
 
4) The “academic freedom as critique” school.  If academics have the 
special capacity to see through conventional public wisdom and 
expose its contradictions, exercising that capacity—the capacity of 
critique—is their real job.  While the “it’s just a job” school and 
the “for the common good” school insist that the freedom 
academics enjoy is limited by the norms of the profession, those 
who identify academic freedom with critique insist that 
professional norms should be interrogated and regarded as objects 
of critical scrutiny rather than as the unexamined parameters 
within which scrutiny is performed.  Schools (1), (2), and (3) 
elevate and celebrate professionalism, albeit in different ways; this 
fourth school is deeply suspicious of professionalism and of all 
established structures of authority. 
 
5) The “academic freedom as training for revolution” school.  This 
school takes the obligation of critique seriously and turns the 
suspicion of established structures into a program for overturning 
them.  If school (4) urges us not to accept professional norms 
without inquiring into their source, members of school (5) know in 
advance where that inquiry will lead—to the discovery that 
professional norms have their source in the corrupt motives of 
agents who are embedded in the corrupt institutions that serve and 
reflect the corrupt values of a corrupt neoliberal society.  With the 
emergence of this school, the shift from “academic” as a limiting 
adjective to freedom as an overriding and global concern is 
complete; frankly political actions take the place of actions 
performed within professional constraints.  “Academic freedom” is 
still a phrase that can be invoked, but its meaning is radically 
changed, as it is when Grant Farred declares that “academic 
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freedom has to be conceived of as a form of political solidarity.”3  
If that is what academic freedom really is, adhering to a narrowly 
professional view of one’s responsibilities in the classroom 
amounts to a betrayal of both one’s political being and one’s 
pedagogical being.  One can be true to the academy only by 
breaking free of its ideologically based constraints. 
Recent events provide a nice illustration of the distance between the 
“it’s just a job” version of academic freedom and the “it’s for revolution” 
version of academic freedom.  In November of 2013, members of the 
American Studies Association voted two to one to support the academic 
boycott of Israeli universities.4  The boycott movement began in Britain in 
2002.5  Boycotters argue that because Israel is a rogue state engaged in acts 
of apartheid and oppression, and because Israeli universities are public and 
administered by the state, it must be assumed that those universities further 
the ends of a repressive regime, either by actively supporting its policies or 
by remaining silent in the face of atrocities.  Therefore it is entirely 
appropriate and a matter of moral urgency for academics in other countries 
to exercise the only power they really have by refusing to engage in 
intellectual discourse with the Israeli academy.  If you have an exchange 
program with an Israeli university, suspend it; if you are the editor of a 
scholarly journal and an Israeli researcher is a member of your editorial 
board, dismiss him. 
Those opposed to the boycott complain that it violates the academic 
freedom of Israeli academics who are being cut off from the intellectual 
conversation at the heart of academic life.  Boycotters reply that Palestinian 
academics and students have been cut off from that same conversation by 
the action of the state that houses the universities they are boycotting.  Tit 
for tat.  You guys did it to them, and now we are going to do it to you.  The 
arguments fly back and forth and many points—largely in my view 
irrelevant, like the point that Israel is being unfairly singled out among 
nations—are made.  From the perspective of the “it’s just a job” school, the 
only point worth making is that boycotters are basing academic decisions—
like the decision to invite or not invite someone to a conference—on a 
political calculation: we dislike the policies of your government and 
therefore we will exclude you from the academic contexts over which we 
have control.  Academic work has been declared an extension of political 
judgment and academic freedom has been sacrificed in order to make a 
 
3  Grant Farred, The Art of Politics Is to Divide, 26/27 WORKS & DAYS 355 (2008-09). 
4  ASA Members Vote to Endorse Boycott of Israeli Academic Institutions, AM.  STUDIES ASSOC., 
http://www.theasa.net/from_the_editors/item/asa_members_vote_to_endorse_academic_boycott/ (last 
visited Apr.  29, 2014). 
5  Id. 
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political point.  Boycotters, in turn, say that the scope of academic freedom 
extends far beyond the routine activities we engage in while teaching and 
researching and encompasses the right and obligation to do whatever one 
can when the freedom of others is being abrogated by the actions of a 
repressive regime.  The historian Howard Zinn makes the point concisely: 
“[t]o me, academic freedom has always meant the right to insist that 
academic freedom be more than academic.”6  To me the expansion of 
academic freedom into a doctrine of political intervention means the end of 
academic freedom because in the course of such an expansion, academic 
concerns have not only been bypassed, but also made to disappear in a puff 
of moralistic smoke. 
II.  THE COMMENTARIES 
In their commentaries, Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer try to open 
up some distance between themselves and me.  Alexander is openly looking 
for something to disagree with and thinks he finds it in my refusal to tie 
academic freedom to goals external to the academy’s everyday workings.7 
(This is a sticking point for several of the commentators.) Alexander 
correctly makes a distinction between an academic’s intention to “produce 
goods extrinsic to disciplinary knowledge,”8 and the contribution academic 
work indirectly and uniu makes to “the world beyond the academy.”9  A 
better informed citizenry, he points out, is a public good to which the 
academy arguably contributes, but academics do not do what they do in 
order to produce a better informed citizenry.  It is, Alexander says, a 
“byproduct.”10  I agree, and I put it this way in the book: one should not 
“confuse the reasons that lead society to pay for an activity with the reasons 
that impel its practitioners to engage in it.”11  Alexander makes the 
additional point that if such byproducts did not exist—if there were no 
evidence that the greater world benefited from the existence of colleges and 
universities—there would be little or “no reason” for the public to support 
the academy.  “Why should others spend scarce resources on activities that 
are only of benefit to those who engage in them?”12  Again, I agree.  If we 
pitch ourselves to members of the public by sharing our scholarly 
 
6  HOWARD ZINN, HOWARD ZINN SPEAKS: COLLECTED SPEECHES, 1962-2009 46 (Anthony 
Arnove ed., 2012). 
7  See Lawrence Alexander, Fish on Academic Freedom: A Merited Assault on Nonsense, But 
Perhaps a Bridge Too Far, 9 FIU L.  REV.  1 (2013). 
8  Id. at 8. 
9  Id. 
10 Id. 
11 FISH, supra note 1 (manuscript at 85). 
12 Alexander, supra note 7, at 8. 
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obsessions with them, the funds will probably not roll in. 
That, however, is a point without intellectual interest.  It speaks to the 
public-relations problem faced by the academy at a time when the once 
taken-for-granted value of higher learning must be argued for and the 
arguments likely to be persuasive—contributions to the state’s bottom line, 
career training, the production of political leaders, etc.—are only obliquely 
related, if related at all, to the aspirations that lead men and women, first, to 
get JD’s and PhD’s and, second, to teach classes, write essays, and engage 
in research.  How should we respond to this unhappy situation?  What can 
we do to shore-up our increasingly precarious position?  Many people are 
asking and trying to answer these questions, but I am not one of them, and I 
feel no obligation to be one.  I’m just trying to figure out what academic 
freedom is which involves of course figuring out what academic work is.  
The fact that the account of academic life I come up with may be 
unsustainable if the public relations problem I ignore is not solved is not my 
concern; or, rather, is only my concern as someone who wants to be paid an 
academic salary and see his students get jobs, and at my age those concerns 
are less and less pressing.  But the fact is of no concern whatsoever to the 
argument I make in this book.  Indeed the argument I make in the book—
that academic work must be engaged in and valued on its own terms and 
not in the terms nominated by some external constituency—is implicitly 
made again when I refuse to take to heart the criticism that my thesis pays 
insufficient attention to the material conditions of academic work.  To 
rehearse once again my oft-intoned mantra, “that’s not my job.” 
Alexander emphasizes another point of agreement between us—that 
the post-modern critique of academic norms doesn’t lay a glove on them.13 
That critique (offered most notably by Judith Butler) says that the norms on 
which the traditional notion of academic freedom rests are socially 
constructed; they did not come along with the planets, and the rocks, and 
trees; they were instituted by men and women like you and me; therefore 
they are suspect and vulnerable to challenge.  Well, academic norms may 
very well be vulnerable to challenge (what isn’t?), but it won’t be because 
they are socially constructed.  For if everything is social constructed as 
postmodernism tells us it is, the fact that something, say an academic norm, 
is socially constructed cannot constitute a criticism of it.  The space for 
criticism exists only if some things are socially constructed and some others 
are not—are natural, free-standing, indubitably real—the very possibility 
postmodernism denies.  So, as Alexander memorably says, “the view that 
our categories are socially constructed is an ‘is’ from which absolutely no 
 
13  Id.  at 5-8. 
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‘ought’ follows;”14 and, he adds, anyone who relies on postmodernism to 
fight his battles “has enlisted an unarmed soldier.”15 
I would say the same of theory in general, postmodern or any other 
kind.  A theoretical pronouncement like “everything is socially constructed” 
or “the measure of the truth of a statement is its correspondence with a 
piece of an independent reality” or “the measure of the truth of a statement 
is its coherence with other statements we already warrant as true” or “the 
meaning of a text is what its author or authors intend” gives you neither 
help nor direction in deciding how to act or what to say in a particular 
situation.  Suppose you are debating whether it’s true that Edward 
Snowden’s actions harmed national security and someone says, “truth is a 
matter of correspondence with reality.”  Will that be received as a helpful 
contribution to the conversation?  I don’t think so.  You cannot get from it 
to the truth or falsehood of any proposition about what Snowden did.  It 
does not tell you how to gather the evidence that might be brought forward 
in support of any proposition.  It does not do anything except declare (by 
implication) that any other account of truth is wrong.  In short, it is a 
statement in another game, the game of high theory or philosophy, and 
while it might have weight and relevance in the precincts of that game, 
when it is transported into another game like the game of making real world 
decisions, it is, as Alexander says, “inert;” it does no work.   
I have belabored the point because it allows me to respond to Fred 
Schauer’s contention that my view of academic freedom is theory-laden 
despite my long-time deprecation of theorizing.16  Well, it depends what 
you think a theory is and I don’t regard the statements of mine Schauer cites 
as theoretical, as being on the level of “truth is a matter of correspondence 
with reality” or its opposite.  Schauer quite accurately rehearses my 
preferred picture of academic work: “[t]o be an academic is for Fish not to 
be a political activist, and not to be an actor in an ideological theat[re], and 
not to be a crusader for an ideological or social goal, even though one might 
be a crusader for one’s view of truth, academically defined.”17  As Schauer 
notes, this vision of academic life is “not the only one” in the field and is 
therefore contestable; what it will be contested by, however, is not some 
theory but an alternative account of what academics do when they are being 
academics and not something else.  If I describe and, in describing, 
prescribe what a teacher who is being properly academic in the classroom 
does, have I offered a theory of teaching?  No, I have offered an account of 
teaching as a distinctive practice—teaching not politics, teaching not 
 
14  Id.  at 6. 
15  Id.  at 7. 
16  See Frederick Schauer, Fish’s Five Theories, 9 FIU L.  REV.  21 (2013). 
17  Id.  at 24. 
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therapy, teaching not patriotic cheerleading, teaching not spiritual 
counseling—and if I am challenged it will be by an alternative account of 
what higher-education teaching involves, one that argues, perhaps, that the 
expression of political views, if labeled and flagged in advance, can 
legitimately be a component of a professor’s academic freedom.  I reject 
that argument—it just gets politics in by the back door—but in rejecting it, I 
am not rejecting a theory; I’m rejecting a practice. 
Or more precisely, I am rejecting the claim that you can be a political 
actor and a pedagogical actor at the same time.  There is, to be sure, 
something strongly normative—not the same thing as theoretical—about 
my position, which Schauer under-describes as the view that “university 
education might be better with less political interference.”18  That I think is 
a weak statement.  The stronger statement, the one I make throughout the 
book, is that university education inflected, from the outside or inside, by 
political interference is not really university education.  Let politics in from 
any direction and education is no longer what is going on.  So it is not quite 
right to say as Schauer does that what is involved in debates about higher 
education is a “policy determination.”19 The policies at odds are not just 
alternative recommendations of how to do something; they are 
recommendations about alternative things to do.  One, mine, says, let’s do 
academic work; the other says, let’s be political.  And again, neither is a 
theory. 
Still the point, and the difference it marks between Schauer and me, is 
largely terminological.  He inserts the word “theory” where I would use 
“account,” and in one place he acknowledges the interchangeability of the 
two for him: “[i]n order to make the ‘[i]t’s just a job claim’ . . . one needs 
an account—that is a theory—of just what a job is.”20  If he means that we 
need a general account of what it means to do a job, I agree, if he means 
that we need a theory of jobs on the level of “truth is a matter of 
correspondence with the facts of the world,” I disagree.  A general account 
of what a job is would provide a checklist that would allow one to 
enumerate the components of an activity and decide if it amounted to a job.  
A theory of what a job is—I cannot even imagine one; “jobness” is not the 
kind of thing one has theories about—would provide nothing. 
I’m a bit surprised by Schauer’s fondness for “theory,” given that for 
most of the time he presents himself as being even more deflationary than I 
am.  He is in a particularly deflationary mood when he discusses the term 
“academic freedom” and says of it, “it’s just a label.”  By that he means 
 
18  Id.  at 26. 
19  Id.  at 26-27. 
20  Id.  at 22. 
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(and I agree with him wholeheartedly) that we shouldn’t think that 
“anything deeply moral is going on” when the label “academic freedom” is 
being invoked.  All that is going on is that academics who (like anyone 
else) want “to do their jobs with a minimum of external interference”21 have 
figured out that attaching the word “freedom” to what they want increases 
their chances of getting it.  Suppose “academic freedom” were replaced as a 
label with “optimal conditions for performing professorial work as defined 
by the professors.” No one would be arguing that there is a constitutional 
right to such conditions or that they included the right and obligation of 
professors to act as international whistleblowers and monitor political 
conditions in this country or abroad.  “Academic freedom” is a misleading 
label in that it suggests that something noble, abstract, and large is on offer.  
But it is a misleading label that has done effective rhetorical work for an 
academy that is always on the defensive; it is politically useful even though, 
properly understood, it does not have a political content.  So while I 
wouldn’t counsel giving up the phrase academic freedom, I would counsel 
those who use it against believing in it too strongly. 
Speaking this way is in keeping with the deflationary style of my 
argument—I want to remove the high gloss and the sanctimony that more 
than occasionally attends invocations of academic freedom, invocations 
that, more often than not, are performed by professors who have been told 
either that they must do something they don’t want to do or that they can’t 
do something that they want to do, and have already done.  What I’m 
saying in the book is that academic freedom is a narrow, even technical 
concept to be understood in terms of tasks, contracts, and working 
conditions, and that it is not, or should not be, the rallying cry of a 
disadvantaged, and supposedly virtuous, minority.  Academic freedom is 
merely the (too grandiose) name given to the argument that because 
academic work has as its goal the discovery of truths about the natural and 
human world, academics must be free to go down any path that seems 
promising in their search for those truths; they must be free, that is, from 
external interference with their internal practices. 
Robert Post disagrees, in part.  He does agree with me that “scholars 
ought to conduct their scholarship according to values that are internal to 
the practice of scholarship,”22 but he does not think that the concept of 
academic freedom is “an essential aspect of the practice;”23 rather, he 
contends, it is “primarily a value used by scholars to defend the autonomy 
of the scholarly enterprise;”24 and given that “it is a concept designed to 
 
21  Id.  at 30. 
22  Robert Post, Why Bother with Academic Freedom?, 9 FIU L.  REV.  9, 11 (2013). 
23  Id. 
24  Id.  at 12. 
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persuade those who are outside the scholarly profession, it can be effective 
only if it is convincing to non-scholars.”25  Moreover, in order to be 
convincing to this constituency, academic freedom “must appeal to 
values . . . that will be external to the profession.”  It would seem, then, that 
Post takes academic freedom even less seriously than I do; in his account, it 
is largely a public-relations device (of the kind I dismissed earlier) that has 
little to do with the internal structure of academic work. 
In response, I would make two points.  First, academic freedom is, in 
fact, part of the scholar’s understanding of what he or she does; it organizes 
the task by distinguishing it from other, non-academic tasks that do not 
require for their performance the latitude claimed (and to some extent 
enjoyed) by academics; and it identifies as part of the price of this latitude a 
restriction on the means available for the doing of the academic task.  An 
academic, for example, knows that in the course of a scholarly dispute one 
should not employ ad hominem arguments, even though such arguments 
would be accepted (and even encouraged) in the context of other endeavors.  
An academic also knows that this restriction is not a matter merely of good 
manners; ad hominem attacks on an opponent’s position, rather than 
directly confronting the position with counter-evidence, make everything 
turn on the opponent’s character: you must not be persuaded by him 
because he cheats on his wife.  That simply is not an academic argument, 
and the doctrine of academic freedom tells you why: the task is the 
identification of truth by means of impartial methods of inquiry, and ad 
hominem arguments are the every antithesis of impartiality; because the 
path of truth’s discovery must be left open—must be free to find its own 
course—the performance of the task must not involve arguments and 
strategies that close it down, and that is surely what ad-hominem arguments 
do.  In short, rather than being external to everyday academic practice, 
academic freedom is constitutive of, is “an essential aspect of,” that 
practice; it tells you what is to be done, how to do it, and how not to do it. 
My second point in response to Post’s relegation of academic freedom 
to a public-relations strategy is to observe that its nature and scope are hotly 
contested within the practice.  Post wants to make a sharp distinction 
between the norms governing academic work on the inside, and the 
academic freedom arguments directed to outside constituencies.  But one’s 
understanding of what the internal norms are will be a function, in large 
part, of one’s understanding of what academic freedom is.  The disputes I 
report on and engage with in the book are simultaneously disputes about the 
nature of academic freedom and academic work.  Those who argue, as 
Judith Butler does, for a more expansive, less narrowly liberal view of 
 
25  Id.  at 13. 
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academic freedom are at the same time arguing for a more expansive, less 
narrowly liberal view of what academic work does.  The dispute about 
whether academic freedom includes the freedom to actively debate political 
issues with a view to resolving them is, again at the same time, a dispute 
about what can properly (i.e.  academically) go on in a classroom. 
Post has two other major points.  The first is that by exiling goals and 
values external to the internal academic enterprise, I deprive myself (and 
the profession) of a justification based on the contribution the academy 
makes to constitutional goals, “VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM can 
have very little to say about constitutional principles of academic 
freedom.”26  That is because I don’t think there are any.  (I give the same 
answer to Saby Ghoshray’s question, “[w]hy have the aspiratory ideals of 
free speech become extrinsic to the core values of academic freedom?”27  
Because they always have been.) I understand the attractiveness of tying 
academic values to constitutional values, but I remain unpersuaded by the 
efforts, including Post’s, to do so.  The underlying question is posed by 
Andrew Koppleman: is there anything intrinsically good about inquiry and 
its orientation?28  A “yes” answer, says Koppleman, would mean that such 
inquiry “is something that society ought to recognize and promote,”29 and 
he identifies the intrinsic good of liberal education with “the capacity to 
reflect on what one is doing.”30  No doubt reflecting on what one is doing is 
good for some people in some circumstances, but there are other 
circumstances in which reflection would be out of place and distracting, and 
there are some people for whom reflection is uncongenial and they are none 
the worse for that.  Promoting and protecting reflection would amount to 
putting society (and perhaps the Constitution) behind philosophy as a 
national priority.  That won’t happen, and I don’t think it should happen.   
A better defense of academic work is put forward by Jack Sammons 
when he says that every practice “seeks to foster within the broader culture 
the ability to appreciate what the practice has on offer.”31  That is, a practice 
does not win public support by having it guaranteed in advance by a 
normative argument; rather, it does its work, sings its song, and hopes that 
many who hear it will be moved to join in.  “Try it, you’ll like it” is the 
message, not, “this is an intrinsic good and you are obliged by virtue or by 
law to ensure its flourishing.”  The practice’s flourishing is its own 
 
26  Id.  at 10. 
27  Saby Ghoshray, Narrative of Academic Freedom Post-9/11: Deconstruction via Symmetry, 
Corporatization and American Exceptionalism, 9 FIU L.  REV.  47, 48 (2013). 
28  Andrew Koppleman, Stanley Fish as Lord Grantham, 9 FIU L.  REV.  57 (2013). 
29  Id.  at 58. 
30  Id. 
31  Jack L.  Sammons, The Common Good of Practices, 9 FIU L.  REV.  69, 69 (2013). 
FISH_PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2014  1:43 PM 
202 FIU Law Review [Vol.  9:191 
responsibility, a responsibility it meets “through its elaboration” by 
“initiating people into its ways of thinking,” by, in other words, “teaching.” 
As academics we have to take our chances, and the best chance we have, I 
would argue, is to do what we do—pursue disinterested inquiry with no 
concern for any practical outcomes or applications—and trust (it may be a 
trust misplaced) that in the end enough people find it compelling. 
Post’s third point is that this description of academic practice as 
something walled off from real world payoffs fails “to account for the 
breadth and diversity of the scholarly practices that actually characterize the 
modern university.”32  He has in mind both departments, like political 
science which, he says, are properly engaged in formulating a position “on 
whether the Israeli occupation of Palestine is or is not legitimate” and 
“practical disciplines like medicine, dentistry or nursing, which study the 
best ways to intervene in the world in order to improve it.”  These I think 
should be distinguished.  Political science departments are dedicated to the 
study of situations like the Israeli occupation of Gaza; it is not their job, nor 
the job of their members, to formulate policy or to declare which of the 
parties to a dispute is right or wrong.  To be sure, professors of political 
science can hire themselves out as advisors and consultants, and in those 
roles they might very well participate in the formulation of policy and lend 
their analytical skills to a partisan strategy.  But when they are doing that 
they are no longer being academics, and when they return to their 
departments, partisan advocacy must be put to the side. 
As for “practical disciplines” like medicine and, yes, law, insofar as 
they seek to “intervene in the world in order to improve it,” they are not 
academic units; they are job training programs, trade schools, and change 
engines and consequently they do not come under the protection of 
academic freedom.  Brian Gilmore is absolutely correct when he observes 
that my argument is not friendly to the claims and aspirations of clinicians 
in law schools.33  He implies that I am on the wrong side of history because 
traditional teaching methods are under siege from those who call for “legal 
training of students that focuses more on actual lawyer-skills training.”34  
He may be right that clinical education, which is, he says, “highly political 
in nature” and subject to the “judgment and scrutiny” of outside 
constituencies, will be central “to the trade’s immediate future.”35  The 
conclusion, however, is not, as he would have it, to “expand/and or 
reconfigure the very notion of ‘academic freedom,’”36 but to recognize that 
 
32  Post, supra note 22, at 10. 
33  Brian Gilmore, Clinical Legal Education and Academic Freedom, 9 FIU L.  REV.  51 (2013) 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
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if law schools continue to move in that direction, “academic” will not be an 
adjective they merit. 
Scott A. Anderson implicitly reaches that conclusion when he observes 
that the “law professor’s guild has determined that not only contemplative, 
but also practical knowledge and skills must be imparted to its students.”37 
Therefore, he concludes, according to Fish, “being a law professor is 
not . . . an academic job” because “it is a job that prepares its students to 
enter and to succeed in another profession: the profession of law.”38  Even 
doctrinal professors “who teach bar examination subjects (such as 
Contracts, Torts and Criminal Procedure) would have to be excluded” given 
that “they would be imparting the knowledge and skills necessary to pass 
the bar exam, a motive extrinsic to ‘advancing knowledge and discovering 
truth.’”39 That’s not quite right.  It depends on whether the contracts or torts 
professor is teaching the structure, history, and normative foundations of 
the subject or is, instead, “teaching to the test,” making decisions about 
assignments and discussion topics on the basis of what he believes will be 
the bar-exam questions.  If it is the first, the professor is still an academic 
doing an academic job; if it is the second, the professor is the equivalent of 
a drill sergeant.  It is a question, as Anderson recognizes, of motive.  It may 
be the case that when teaching the subject in an academic rather than a 
“practical” way, practical knowledge—knowledge useful to bar-exam 
takers—will be imparted, but that will not have been the professor’s 
primary purpose.  (It may be the purpose motivating a student’s choice to 
take a course, but that is another, and irrelevant, matter).   
Purpose, as Joshua Youngkin sees, is the engine of my analysis.40 
When thinking about academic work and academic freedom everything 
depends on it.  This is what John K. Wilson misses when he finds problems 
with my “testing professors for the political content of their work.”41  That 
is precisely what I do not do.  No content, political or otherwise, is out of 
bounds; what is out of bounds is any content that is made the vehicle of a 
political purpose.  I do not reject politics as the subject of a professor’s 
work.  I reject politics as the form of a professor’s action.  The question is 
not, what are you talking about—you can talk about anything so long as 
there is something interestingly analytic to say about it—the question is, 
what are you trying to do by talking about it?  Are you trying to add to the 
sum of knowledge, or are you trying to get your students (or your readers) 
 
37  Scott A. Anderson, We Represent the Law Prof Guild, 9 FIU L.  REV.  33, 33 (2013). 
38  Id. 
39  Id. at 34. 
40  See Joshua Youngkin, Fish on Purpose, 9 FIU L.  REV.  81 (2013). 
41  John K. Wilson, Stanley Fish and the Politics of Academic Freedom, 9 FIU L.  REV.  79 
(2013). 
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to assume a political stance preliminary to their taking a political action?  If 
you’re doing the one, you’re being an academic; if you’re doing the other, 
you’re not, and no question of your academic freedom could possibly arise. 
Ernest Weinrib says that I am not entitled to my position as just stated, 
because I refuse to claim any normative status for it.42 That is, while I insist 
on the autonomy of the academic enterprise and the importance of keeping 
it free of politics, I also insist that no realm can be free of politics in a 
strong sense.  Weinrib says that I cannot “hold both of these incompatible 
positions.”43  I think I can because they are asserted at different levels of 
generality.  When I say that no realm of organization or thought can be free 
of politics in a strong sense, I am speaking of the unavailability of a 
perspective or point of view that is not hostage to controversial substantive 
propositions: the academy I envision and argue for—the academy that 
enforces a distinction between disinterested contemplation and action—is 
undergirded by assumptions and values one might reasonably contest, and 
is, therefore, in a very general sense, political; it did not come down to us 
from God or from some Platonic/Aristotelian identification of universals.  
But, as Weinrib points out, this notion of the political is so broad that it 
“excludes nothing” and disables the making of distinctions; and, as he says, 
“[t]hinking involves distinguishing one thing from another.”44 
Yes it does, and that is why the mantra “everything is political” is at 
once true and trivial.  After you have run it up the flagpole, there is nothing 
you can do with it (it is another version of Alexander’s inert and unarmed 
soldier); and if you want to do something you have to put it to one side.  
That’s what I do when I say in effect, okay, in a very general sense 
alternative conceptions of the academy and academic freedom are political, 
but within that very general and toothless category of the political, there are 
on-the ground differences that are real—they imply different forms of 
action and judgment—and we can sort them out and affirm some and reject 
others.  The difference I am interested in is the difference between an 
academy where the task is to analyze ideas and propositions and an 
academy where analysis is valuable only insofar as it leads to or provides 
support for an action designed to alter the world.  I believe that I can at once 
maintain the reality of that difference, catalog the gains and losses that 
accompany the two visions of academic life, and still, in a more theoretical 
vein, affirm the inescapability of politics on a level so general that it doesn’t 
matter. 
My question is, do you want academic decisions and partisan political 
 
42  Ernest Weinrib, Academic, Not Political, 9 FIU L.  REV.  77 (2013). 
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
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decisions to be discontinuous—basically different things—or do you want 
them to bleed into each other?  (Do you want, for example, decisions to 
invite speakers to a conference to turn on the nationality of the candidates?) 
My book answers that nitty-gritty question by: (a) looking at the practices 
of the academy; (b) identifying the internal good that animates them and 
makes them intelligible; and (c) arguing that the internal good will be lost if 
we do not maintain the distinctiveness of the academic task, a 
distinctiveness that rests on its insulation from politics in the small “p” 
partisan sense.  I was taught how to do that by Weinrib, who explains in his 
brilliant article Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, that 
the first step in intellectual work is to identify the “immanent intelligibility” 
of whatever we are trying to understand, the “determinate content” that 
makes it a “this” not a “that.”45  He asks, ‘what is the thisness of tort law?’  
I ask, ‘what is the thisness of academic work?’  He believes, I think, that in 
coming up with an answer, he has uncovered an intrinsic normative 
essence.  I believe that in coming up with an answer, I have pin-pointed the 
constituent features of a form of social organization that could have been 
otherwise, but is in its present form worth preserving because of the 
activity—disinterested inquiry—it makes possible.  He says that he likes 
my conclusions; they follow from his premises. 
 
 
45  See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 Yale L.J.  
949 (1988). 
